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Race, Reason, and Representation
Tayyab Mahmud"
Liberalism and Empire: A Study in Nineteenth-Century British Liberal
Thought. By Uday Singh Mehta.
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press 1999. Pp. 237. $45.00.
"[A]ll men are created equal," proclaimed the drafters of the
American Declaration of Independence while taking slavery for
granted.' Champions of the French Revolution deemed Haitian
Blacks and Creoles not worthy of liberty, equality and fraternity.2
Liberalism, which claims universality and prides itself for its politi-
cally inclusionary character, furnished justifications for European
tutelage of colonial subjects. 3 Britain, following the reform bills of
the nineteenth century, in its self-image was a democracy, yet it
held a vast empire that was undemocratic in its acquisition and
4governance. Following Locke, exercise of political power was
* Associate Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, Cleveland State Uni-
versity. I would like to thank Sheldon Gelman and Ratna Kapur for their thoughtful com-
ments on earlier drafts. Any remaining errors are, of course, my own.
' See generally JOSEPH J. ELLIS, AMERICAN SPHINX: THE CHARACTER OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON (1997) (discussing Jefferson's views on slavery); PAUL FINKLEMAN, SLAVERY AND
THE FRAMERS: RACE AND LIBERTY IN THE AGE OF JEFFERSON (1996); EDUMND S. MORGAN,
AMERICAN SLAVERY, AMERICAN FREEDOM: THE ORDEAL OF COLONIAL VIRGINIA (1975) (de-
scribing paradoxical relationship between notions of slavery and freedom in colonial Vir-
ginia).
See generally CAROLYN E. FICK, THE MAKING OF HAITI: THE SAINT DOMINGUE
REVOLUTION FROM BELOW (1990) (describing Haitians' slave revolt against France that
began in 1791 and ended in independence in 1804); C.L.R. JAMES, THE BLACKJACOBINS:
TOUSSAINT L'OUVERTURE AND THE SAN DOMINGO REVOLUTION (2d ed. 1963) (presenting
historical background of Haiti).
See, e.g., Bhikhu Parekh, Superior People: The Narrowness of Liberalism from Mill to Rawls,
TIMES LITERARY SUPPLEMENT, Feb. 25 1994, at 11.
' The nineteenth-century Reform Bills included laws extending education, creating a
competitive civil service examination, broadening House of Commons representation, re-
forming child labor laws and the Poor Law system, centralizing such governmental activities
as road construction and adopting a freer trade policy by reducing protective tariffs. The
Judicature Acts 1873 and the Appellate Jurisdiction Act 1876 streamlined the judicial system,
professionalized legal practice and hastened the fusion of law and equity. SeeJ.H. BAKER, AN
INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY (3d ed. .1990); A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO
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deemed linked with rights of citizens, and yet in the colonies power
was overwhelmingly exercised over subjects rather than citizens.
Liberals recognized good government as intimately linked with
self-government, and yet repudiated this linkage in the colonies.
These anomalies of modern history have vexed many as they
raise intriguing questions about the past, present and future of
modernity's promise of freedom, autonomy and dignity for all.
Author E. P. Thompson succinctly articulated the question: how
did ideas of equality, liberty and fraternity lead to empire, liberti-
cide, and fracticide? What is the source of the disjunction be-
tween the theory of liberalism and its history? Is the gulf between
the two inevitable or incidental? Is it rooted in epistemological
posture of modern thought, theoretical lacunas of liberalism or
theorists' visions distorted by the racism of their milieu? Uday
Singh Mehta's Liberalism and Empire: A Study in Nineteenth-Century
British Liberal Thought is a timely and thoughtful attempt to exam-
ine these questions.6
Mehta's project is to examine British liberal thought in the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries "by viewing it through the
mirror that reflects its association with the British Empire."7 He
wants to understand how liberal theorists "responded to parts of
the world with which they were largely unfamiliar but which also
intensely preoccupied them."8 The derivative query that informs
the book is "the liberal justification of the empire. "9 An accom-
THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION (E.C.S. Wade ed., 10th ed. 1958). Many
scholars have provided useful accounts of British colonial expansion. See CA. BAYLY,
IMPERIAL MERIDIAN: THE BRrrISH EMPIRE AND THE WORLD, 1780-1830 (1989); P.J. CAIN &
A.G. HOPKINS, 1 BRITISH IMPERIALISM 1688-1914 (1993); FRANCIS HUTCHINS, ILLUSION OF
PERMANENCE: BRITISH IMPERIALISM IN INDIA (1967); P.J. MARSHALL, A FREE THOUGH
CONQUERING PEOPLE: BRITAIN AND ASIA IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY (1968).
5 See E.P. THOMPSON, THE ROMANTICS: ENGLAND IN A REVOLUTIONARY AGE 65-66
(1997). Other authors have provided useful studies of the evolution and content of liberal-
ism. See, e.g., GUIDO DE RUGGIERO, THE HISTORY OF EUROPEAN LIBERALISM (R.G. Coiling-
wood trans., 1927); RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977); ERNEST GELLNER,
CONDITIONS OF LIBERTY: CIL SOCIETY AND ITS RIVALS (1994); HAROLDJ. LASKI, THE RISE OF
EUROPEAN LIBERALISM (Transaction Publishers 1997) (1936); ROBERT NozIcK, ANARCHY,
STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974); KARL K. POPPER, THE OPEN SOCIETY AND ITS ENEMIES (1945);
JOSEPH RAz, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM (1986); MICHAEL SANSEL, LIBERALISM AND THE
LIMITS OFJUSTICE (1982).
6 See UDAY SINGH MEHTA, LIBERALISM AND EMPIRE: A STUDY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY
BRITISH LIBERAL THOUGHT (1999) [hereinafter MEHTA, LIBERALISM AND EMPIRE].
7 Id. at 1.
8 Id.
Id. at 2. Other studies examine the relationship between utilitarianism and British
colonialism of India. See, e.g., THOMAS R. METCALF, THE NEW CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF INDIA:
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plished scholar of liberal thought, '° Mehta explores why liberals
endorsed empire as a legitimate form of political governance, justi-
fied its undemocratic and nonrepresentative structure, invoked
categories of history, civilizational hierarchies, and race and blood
to fashion arguments for the empire's necessity and prolongation.
Furthermore, Mehta wants to contrast this with the posture of
Edmund Burke, by common acknowledgement a leading modern
conservative, who retained a sustained skepticism towards colonial
rule and voiced moral and political indignation against injustices,
cruelty, caprice, and exploitation of empire. Mehta subscribes to
Harold Laski's view that on "Ireland, America, and India [Burke]
was at every point upon the side of the future" and that "he was the
first English statesman to fully understand the moral import of the
problem of subject races."
Liberal justifications of colonial subjugation are ironic given the
foundations of liberal thought. Liberalism professes an abiding
commitment to securing individual liberty and human dignity
through a political cast that typically involves democratic and rep-
resentative institutions, the guaranty of individual rights of prop-
erty, the freedom of expression, association, and conscience, all of
which are taken to limit the authority of the state. But the liberal
involvement with the British Empire is broadly coeval with liberal-
ism itself. This leads Mehta to explore the chronological corre-
spondence in the development of liberal thought and empire, and
the clear though complex link between the ideas that are central to
liberalism and those that undergirded practices of imperialism.
Mehta's method is to examine the writings of a small though
significant group of liberal political thinkers as they reflected on
British rule in India, viewing the latter as "the promised land of
liberal ideas - a kind of test case laboratory." 2 Importantly, Mehta
insists that the claims he makes about liberalism are "integral to its
political vision and not peculiar amendments or modifications im-
IDEOLOGIES OF THE RAJ (1994); ERIc S. STOKES, THE ENGLISH UTILITARIANS AND INDIA
(1959); Raghavan Iyer, Utilitarianism and Empire in India, in MODERN INDIA: AN INTERPRETIVE
ANTHOLOGY (Thomas Metcalf ed., 1971).
'0 See, e.g., UDAY SINGH MEHTA, THE ANXIETY OF FREEDOM: IMAGINATION AND
INDIDUALITY IN LOCKE'S POLITICAL THOUGHT (1992); Uday S. Mehta, Liberal Strategies of
Exclusion, in TENSIONS OF EMPIRE: COLONIAL CULTURES IN A BOURGEOIS WORLD 59 (Freder-
ick Cooper & Ann Laura Stoler eds., 1997).
11 HAROLD J. LASKI, POLITICAL THOUGHT IN ENGLAND FROM LOCKE TO BENTHAM 149,
153 (1950).
2 MEHTA, LIBERALISM AND EMPIRE, supra note6, at 9.
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posed on it by the attention to India." 3 His primary motivation is
to study "how liberal theorists responded to the challenge of a
world marked by unmistakably different ways of organizing social
and political life, molding and expressing individuality and free-
dom: in a word, an unfamiliar world marked by different ways of
being in it.' 4 Mehta argues that the primary factor conditioning
the liberal response to empire was "the awareness of the inequality
of power." 5 Furthermore, he discerns a two-fold effect of this
background condition. On the one hand, it gives to liberal
thought about India "an assertive expansiveness, a confidence of
judgment, an unqualified energy, and often an acute sense of ur-
gency and mission." 6 On the other, it "lends to the disagreements
within British thoughts on India a tone of doubt, dilemmatic dis-




Mehta finds the inequality of power implicated in the question
of race, a question he notes is "conspicuous in its absence"'8 in Brit-
ish liberals' writings on India. The surprising exception is John
Stuart Mill, who elaborates the term through the biological notion
of "blood," and draws what he takes to be the crucial distinction in
terms of readiness for representative institutions by reference to
"of [our] own blood" and those not of our blood.' 9 Mehta wonders
if the relative absence of race in this discourse is symptomatic of a
deeper denial, that of not wishing to acknowledge the unfamiliar,
or whether for the liberals "race is a visible mark of the unfamiliar,
so that to allow it to stand for that alterity and the plethora of dif-
ferences that lie behind it might limit the very constructive enter-
prise through which it can be molded to become, or at least ap-
pear, familiar." 20  This is where imperial pedagogy comes in,
whereby race "operates in the malleable and concealed space be-
" Id. at 9.
14 Id. at ll.
15 Id.
1 Id.
7 Id. at 13.
IS Id. at 15.
' John Stuart Mill, Considerations on Representative Government, in JOHN STUART MILL,
THREE ESSAYS 402 (1975) (1861). Several perceptive studies examine Mill's positions about
colonialism. See, e.g., Eileen P. Sullivan, Liberalism and Imperialism: John Stuart Mill's Defense of
the British Empire, 44J. HIST. IDEAS 599 (1983); R.J. Moore, John Stuart Mill at the East India
Home, 20 HIST. STUD. 497 (1983); Lynn Barry Zastoupil, John Stuart Mill and the British
Empire: An Intellectual Biography (1985) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of
Minnesota) (on file with author).
MEHTA, LIBERALISM AND EMPIRE, supra note 6, at 15.
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hind the starkness of blood and color to reproduce the familiar,
even if somatically refracted, category of being English. 21 Mehta
notes here Macaulay's agenda for colonial education targeted at
producing a "class of persons, Indian in blood and color, but Eng-
lish in taste, in opinions, in morals, and in intellect. 2 2 Entry into
representative politics, thus, is not open to all, with race deemed a
mark of eligibility and lesser races obligated to undergo a process
of tutelage by the higher race in order to acquire the requisite cer-
tifications of eligibility.
Mehta also locates the issue of power in the very stance and the
point of view that particular ideas assume with respect to other
ideas and forms of life. This he sees not as a matter of choice but
determined by epistemological foundations of any particular set of
ideas. He locates the liberal gaze in a judgmental rationality
whereby the strange and the unfamiliar have meaning only within
the general structure of what it would mean for facts to hang to-
gether rationally, and by their placement along the presumed lin-
ear trajectory of history.
For Mehta, " [I] iberal imperialism is impossible without this epis-
temological commitment - which by the nineteenth century sup-
ports both the paternalism and progressivism - that is, the main
theoretical justifications - of the empire." 23 Rooted in Western
philosophical tradition's posture towards correspondence between
language and objects, the conditions for intelligibility forwarded by
rationality render the singular intelligible only by reference to the
general. This is predicated on the assumption that the strange is
just a variation of what is already familiar, because both the familiar
and the strange are deemed to be merely specific instances of a
familiar structure of generality.
Highlighting the inextricable linkage between knowledge and
power, Mehta argues that "the epistemological perspective that
articulates that structure also undergirds an elaborate vision of how
" Id.
THOMAS BABINGTON MACAULAY, Minute on Indian Education, in SELECTED WRITINGS
237, 249 (John Clive & Thomas Piney eds., 1972); see alsoJOSEPH HAMBURGER, MACAULAY
AND THE WHIG TRADITION (1976) (describing relationship of Macaulay with English political
thought). For a perceptive study of the connection between colonialism and colonial educa-
tion policies, see GAURI VISWANATHAN, MASKS OF CONQUEST: LITERARY STUDY AND BRITISH
RULE IN INDIA (1989), Peter Robb, British Rule and Indian "Improvement, "34 ECON. HiST. REV.
507 (1981), and Gerald Sirkin & Natalie Robinson Sirkin, The Battle of Indian Education:
Macaulay's Opening Salvo Newly Discovered, 14 VICTORIAN STUD. 407 (1971).
MEHTA, LIBERALISM AND EMPIRE, supra note 6, at 18.
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politically to assimilate things, even when those things are
thoroughly unfamiliar."2 4 This he terms "the cosmopolitanism of
reason."25 When faced with the unfamiliar, then, liberals can do no
more than repeat and assert the familiar structures of generalities,
which "in a single glance and without having experienced any of it,..
. make it possible to compare and classify the world. ", 26 Mehta finds
in this glance the urge to dominate the world because "the
language of those comparisons is not neutral and cannot avoid'
notions of superiority and inferiority, backward and progressive,
and higher and lower." 27 As some liberals did resist this urge,
Mehta's claim is not "that liberalism must be imperialistic, only that
the urge is internal to it."
28
For Mehta, what is denied in the rational assertions of familiarity
of the unfamiliar is the archaic, the premodern, the religious,
along with sentiments, feelings, sense of location, and forms of life
of which they are a part. Here, again, he finds Burke's posture a
salutary one, not because he has a more realistic epistemology, but
rather because his thought is pitched at a level that takes seriously
the sentiments, feelings, and attachments through which peoples
are, and aspire to be, at home. This posture of thought acknowl-
edges that the integrity of experience is tied to its locality and
Burke does not presume to understand the unfamiliar simply on
account of his being rational, modern, or British.
This openness to the possibility that the unfamiliar may remain
unfamiliar, Mehta finds undergirded by humility. He argues that
Burke "shatters the philosophical underpinnings of the project of
the empire by making it no more than a conversation between two
strangers."2 This Mehta terms "the cosmopolitanism of senti-
ments." 3° It holds out the possibility of wider bonds of sympathy
and understanding of sentiments through an open-ended conver-
sation, not guided by any authorizing regime of reason or teleol-
ogy. In this acknowledgement of the unfamiliar remaining so,
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Mehta discerns "the possibility of mutual understanding, mutual
influence, and mutual recognition.
31
In the liberal discourse on empire, Mehta discerns pervasive de-
ployment of the metaphor of childhood as a fixed point underlying
the various imperial projects of education, governance and pro-
gress. Indians, for example, are characterized as being in the in-
fancy of the "'progress of civilization,' 32 necessitating that the Brit-
ish rule like fathers who are "'just and unjust, moderate and rapa-
cious,' 3 3 as a means of "gradually training the people to walk
alone,"34 and enabling them to "grow to man's estate."35 For liber-
als, then, Indians are children for whom the empire offers the
prospect of legitimate and progressive parentage and towards
which Britain, as a parent, is similarly obligated and competent.3
This point is the basis for the justification of denying democratic
rights and representative institutions to Indians.
Mehta traces the pedigree of this idea in the liberal tradition that
originates in Locke's characterization of tutelage as a necessary
stage through which children must be trained before they can ac-
quire the reason requisite for expressing contractual consent. Me-
hta focuses on the exclusionary effect of the distinction between
universal anthropological capacities and the necessary conditions
for their political actualization posited by liberalism. He sees the
exclusionary basis of liberalism "deriv[ing] from its theoretical core
. . . because behind the capacities ascribed to all human beings
exists a thicker set of social credentials that constitute the real
bases of political inclusion." 7 Liberalism claims to be trans-
historical, transcultural, and transracial. The universality claims
rest on certain minimal anthropological characteristics posited as
being common to all human beings. Central among these are that
everyone is naturally free, that all are, in the relevant moral re-
spects, equal, and finally that they are rational. Not only are all, by
3' Id. at 23.
3' Id. at 31 (quotingJames Mill's multi-volume The History of British India).
Id. (quoting Thomas B. Macaulay, Warren Hastings, in CRITICAL AND HISTORICAL
ESSAYS 86 (1903)).
" SeeMill, supra note 19, at 175-76.
itCHARLES E. TREVELYAN, ON THE EDUCATION OF THE PEOPLE OF INDIA 187 (London,
Longman Orme, Brown, Green & Longmans 1838).
' See Asis Nandy, Reconstructing Childhood: A Critique of the Ideology of Adulthood, in
TRADITIONS, TYRANNY, AND UTOPIAS: ESSAYS IN THE POLITICS OF AWARENESS (1987) (provid-
ing insightful discussion of concept of childhood in colonial context).
37 MEHTA, LIBERALISM AND EMPIRE, supra note 6, at 48-49.
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their natures, perfectly free, this condition itself allows each to give
to one's persons, one's possessions, and one's actions strikingly
extreme expressions. It is this individual that becomes the subject
of the contractual agreement from which liberal political institu-
tions derive.
This elaboration of the natural condition by Locke provokes an
obvious question: what ensures that this condition of perfect free-
dom will not result in a state of license and anarchy? Locke's clas-
sic answer is the bounds of the law of nature, accessible through
natural human reason. Mehta argues that Locke's minimalist an-
thropology, while serving as the foundation of his institutional
claims, also exposes the vulnerability of those institutions because
"the potentialities of the Lockean individual reside as a constant
internal threat to the regularities requisite for Lockean institu-
tions."'" This necessitates mechanisms to ensure constancy and
moderation in the expression of interests and desires of the citi-
zens of the commonwealth. The means of doing so are positing
conditions of political inclusion.
While C. B. Macperson and Carol Pateman rest their well-known
arguments of political exclusions in Locke on the revealing silences
of his texts, Mehta builds his case on the very language of those
texts. Here, Locke's views on children are deemed critical. Along
with lunatics and idiots, children are explicitly and unambiguously
excluded from Lockean consensual politics. For Locke, consent is
the fundamental ground for the legitimacy of political authority.
Consent requires acting in view of certain constraints that Locke
broadly designates as the laws of nature. To know these laws re-
quires reason. Those who are unable to exercise reason either
permanently (e.g., madmen) or temporarily (e.g., children) do not
meet a necessary requisite for the expression of consent. By impli-
cation, therefore, they are excluded from the political constitu-
ency, or what amounts to the same thing, to be governed without
their consent. Political inclusion is thus contingent upon a quali-
fied capacity to reason.
Id. at 55.
See generally C.B. MACPHERSON, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF POSSESSIVE INDIVIDUALISM:
HOBBES AND LOCKE 194-262 (1962) (discussing Locke's political theory of appropriation);
CAROL PATEMAN, THE SEXUAL CONTRACT 52-55 (1988) (describing how Locke and other
social contract theorists maintain silence about "sexual contract").
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What then is involved in developing the requisite capacities and
credentials to be able to reason? Mehta focuses on Locke's answer
detailed in Thoughts Concerning Education 0 Here, Locke suspends
the anthropological guarantee that natural human reason gives us
a preconventional access to the precepts of natural law. Instead,
the emphasis is wholly on the precise and detailed processes
through which this rationality must get inculcated. Capacity to
reason becomes a question of breeding an understanding of social
and hierarchical distinctions. Education becomes an initiation
into the enormously significant specifications of time, place and
social status. Of course, "a Prince, a Nobleman and an ordinary
Gentleman's son, should have different ways of breeding,"41 so they
learn Christianity, the laws of England, obedience, respect for
property and "civility in their language . . . towards their inferiors
and the meaner sort of people, particularly servants. 42 Mehta finds
that the terms Locke uses and norms he advocates "draw on and
encourage conceptions of human beings that are far from abstract
and universal, and in which the anthropological minimum is bur-
ied under a thick set of social inscriptions and signals."4 3 The ac-
tual subject of Lockean politics turns out to be propertied, white,
Christian and male.
Mehta then moves to uncover strategies of exclusion deployed by
liberals to exclude Indian colonial subjects from the primary prom-
ise of liberalism, representative government. The first, exemplified
by James Mill, is the maneuver to characterize India as impenetra-
ble, resistant to logical inquiry and inscrutable. For Mehta, the
distinction between something that resists comprehension and
something that is inscrutable is critical. The former description
permits of a future change in which the object may, finally, become
comprehensible. It also places the onus on the comprehending
subject and not on the studied object. It suggests a limitation on
one's knowledge without predicating this on any essentiality of the
object.
In contrast, inscrutability designates an unfathomable limit to
the object of inquiry without implicating either the process of in-
. JOHN LOCKE, SOME THOUGHTS CONCERNING EDUCATION (Cambridge Univ. Press
1934) (1693).
" Id. at 187.
" Id. at 102.
" MEHTA, LIBERALISM AND EMPIRE, supra note 6, at 63.
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quiry or the inquirer. Here the object is made to appear on its own
reckoning as something that defies description and, hence, recep-
tion. Inscrutability places a limit on political possibilities by closing
off the prospect that the object satisfies the conditions requisite for
political inclusion. Lacking in Locke's reason, or, for that matter,
Rawl's reasonableness,44 the inscrutable stands akin to inanimate
objects that Hobbes claimed must be represented precisely because
they cannot give authority on their own behalf.
45
If the exclusionary effect of inscrutability is achieved by the
crude descriptive fiat in refusing to engage in the particulars of
India, the next strategy Mehta explores represents an almost total
reversal. This involves delving into the arcane details of India's
ancient theological, cultural and historical particulars, and
through them, exposing the deficiencies of Indian political and
psychological endowments. Here, the universal anthropological
minimum yields to a complex set of individual and social indexes
as the prerequisites of political inclusion. Mehta terms this "the
strategy of civilizational infantilism."4
To ground his argument, Mehta examines the writings of John
Stuart Mill, and finds his chapter on "The Government of Dependencies
by a Free State," "a revealing document on the increasing relevance
of cultural, civilizational, linguistic, and racial categories in defin-
ing the constituency of Mill's liberalism. 47 Mill divides colonized
countries into two classes. The first is composed of countries "of
similar civilization to the ruling country; capable of, and ripe for,
representative government: such as the British possessions in
America and Australia."4 The other class includes "others, like
India, [that] are still at a great distance from that state."4 9 Mill
finds the practice of English colonialism towards those who "were
of her [England's] own blood and language" variously "vicious,"
economically ill advised, and a betrayal of a "fixed principle . ..
professed in theory" regarding free and democratic governance.5O
Regarding the second class of countries - countries whose race,
language and culture were different from the British - Mill's rec-
SeeJohn Rawls, Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory, 77J. PHIL. 515, 525-28 (1980).
SeeTHOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 217-22 (Viking Penguin 1968) (1651).
46 MEHTA, LIBERALISM AND EMPIRE, supra note 6, at 69-70.
47 Id. at 70.
m Mill, supra note 19, at 402.
49 Id.
Id. at 402-03.
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ommendations are strikingly different. Not only is he opposed to
dismantling colonialism, he strongly recommends that colonial
rule be authoritarian. Absolute rule "guaranteed by irresistible
force.., is the ideal rule of a free people over a barbarous or semi-
barbarous one."' To govern a people different from one's self
only allows for "a choice of despotisms, " 2 precluding the possibility
of representative governance.
As for the principle of liberty, for Mill "[i] t is, perhaps, hardly
necessary to say that this doctrine is meant to apply only to human
beings in the maturity of their faculties."53 The group of such hu-
man beings excludes not only children but also "those backward
states of societies in which the race itself may be considered as in its
nonage."54 Having classified human beings in immutably distinct
hierarchical categories, Mill is constrained to acknowledge that he
had "ceased to consider representative democracy as an absolute
principle, and regarded it as a question of time, place, and circum-
stance."
55
For classical liberalism, then, political institutions such as repre-
sentative democracy are dependent on society having reached a
particular historical maturation or level of civilization. But such
maturation is seen as differentially achieved. Hence those societies
in which higher accomplishments of civilization have not occurred
do not satisfy the conditions for representative government. Un-
der such conditions liberalism in the form of empire services the
deficiencies of the past for societies that have been stunted
through history. This is the kernel of liberal justifications for em-
pire. Mehta likens empire validated by liberalism to "an engine
that tows societies stalled in their past into contemporary time and
history. "56 And this reading of progress and history "derives cen-
trally from premises about reason as the appropriate yardstick for
judging individual and collective lives.
"
51
For Mehta, "[t]he central axis on which nineteenth-century lib-
eral justifications of the empire operate is time, and its cognate,
" Id. at 409.
51 Id. at 410.
53 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, in JOHN STEWART MILL, THREE ESSAYS, supra note 19, at
15.
Id.
JOHN STUART MILL, AUTOBIOGRAPHY 120 (Columbia Univ. Press 1924) (1873).
MEHTA, LIBERALISM AND EMPIRE, supra note 6, at 82.
57 Id.
159120001
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patience."58 Rooted in global orientation of modern European
historiography, nineteenth century liberals saw politics and history
as only different aspects of the same study. Backwardness gets
coded as a remnant of the past, a temporal deficit, which can be
remedied by political intervention turning colonizers' present into
the natives' future. While this past and future are the sources of
liberalism's colonial agenda of reform, they limit the ability of the
liberals to understand unfamiliar life forms. Mehta argues that
"the contemporaneity of these unfamiliar life forms cannot be spo-
ken of in the register of historical time, for that register translates
them into the linearity of backwardness and thus immediately con-
ceives of them in terms of an already known future."59 Extant
forms of living are then taken as only provisional and experience of
these forms is either exoticized or denied.
The discourse of a progressive history and the notion of a single
and continuous time "naturalizes what in fact were often aggressive
and violent efforts to suppress multiple and extant temporalities
and corresponding life forms." ° This vision of history and time
also forces liberalism in its colonial career to jettison its commit-
ment to the primacy of the individual. The colonized subject is
spoken for by the society of which she is a member, and that soci-
ety is spoken for by the historiography that determined the stage of
development that society is deemed to have achieved. 6
Mehta then examines liberal positions towards territorial space
as a clue to its complicity with empire. He first notes that liberal
thought seldom gives theoretical attention to the monumental spa-
tial size of empire. He finds that theoretical assumptions of liberal-
ism do not readily comport with the considerations that give terri-
tory its political salience. Mehta finds Locke's theory of private
property resting on two claims: first, that nature in itself is all but
worthless, and second, that individual labor is the source of value.




E The relationship of modern theories of history with colonialism and modem con-
structions of race has been the basis of insightful analyses. See, e.g., MICHEL ROLPH
TROUILLOT, SILENCING THE PAST: POWER AND THE PRODUCTION OF HISTORY (1995); ROBERT
YOUNG, WHITE MYTHOLOGIES: WRITING HISTORY AND THE WEST (1995); Dipesh Chakrabarty,
Postcoloniality and the Artifice of History: Who Speaks for 'Indian' Pasts?, 37 REPRESENTATIONS 1
(1992); Michel de Certeau, The Historiographical Operation, in THE WRITING OF HISTORY (Tom
Conley trans., 1988); Asis Nandy, History's Forgotten Doubles, 34 HIST. & THEORY 44 (1995).
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prior to appropriation through labor, neither the reception from
God, the holding, nor the fact of its being common has any indi-
vidual, social, or political significance.
For Mehta, by divesting a nature given and held in common of
any emotive force, classical liberalism blocks an important moment
of commonness from furnishing a sense of collectivity, and thus
being a collective experience. The rendering of nature, and the
encounter with it, sentimentally inert, denies locational attach-
ments as having any significance in relation to political identity.
Imagining nature as a physically and emotionally vacant space, with
no binding potential, makes it conceptually difficult to articulate
the origins and continued existence of distinct political societies
having territorial boundaries.
This posture lends itself to the denial of any distinct political
community of the colonized on account of their living in a distinct
physical space. Mehta's position is that territorial boundaries of
societies "reflect a distinct cognitive or emotional reality of their
members in which the physical considerations demarcate a positive
collective identification., 62 The liberal inability to acknowledge a
mutually constitutive relationship between bounded territory and
polity precludes recognition of Indians as a distinct political com-
munity; a recognition that would open up questions of autonomy
and self-governance, thus challenging the validity of imperialism.
Mehta compares liberalism's engagement with imperialism to
the posture adopted by Burke. He shows how Burke saw through
the abusive distortions of civilizational hierarchies, racial superior-
ity, and assumptions of cultural impoverishment by which British
power justified its empire. Burke's consciousness that racial preju-
dice always lurked around the colonial question is evidenced by his
comment about his unremitting intensity on Indian matters, that "I
know what I am doing; whether the white people like it or not."63
For Burke, the existence of political society does not turn exclu-
sively on such individual capacities as reason, will, and the ability to
choose, but also on the presence of a certain order on the ground.
Rejecting the centrality of consent, Burke contends that inheri-
tances are in some crucial measure involuntary and that they bind
MEHTA, LIBERALISM AND EMPIRE, supra note 6, at 131.
SELECTED LETTERS OF EDMUND BuRKE 381 (Harvey C. Mansfield ed., 1984). See gener-
ally SARA SULERI, THE RHETORIC OF ENGLISH INDIA 25-74 (1992) (providing nuanced analysis
of Burke's writings on India).
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us through the inescapable mediation of location and past. This
permits him to see political society and order in India, not just the
prospect of it through tutored development. This leads Mehta to
argue that "India's potential nationhood was evident to [Burke]
centuries before it was to most Indians."
64
Mehta notes that Burke was not only concerned with the destruc-
tive impact of colonialism on the colonies but also its corrosive and
corrupting affect on Britain itself. Here Mehta fails to explore the
extent to which Burke prefigures an increasing focus of post-
colonial studies to examine the extent to which modem Europe
itself is a product of the colonial encounter between the West and
the rest. Mehta also leaves unexplored the question as to what ex-
tent Burke's position on colonialism was shaped by his Catholic
and Irish background.65 Mehta also compares liberal postulates of
time space with those of Mahatama Gandhi and nationalist forces
in the colonies. For Gandhi the question of civilization is purely
individualistic, turning on how human beings are able to follow the
dictates of their duty and morality. This conception of civilization
precludes reliance on stages of history or the tutelage of one peo-
ple by the other.
Nationalism in the colonies repudiates the developmental chro-
nology of imperialism, and displaces history by making culture and
geography the grounds for claims of political community and self-
governance. Mehta's exposition of Gandhi's thought and the na-
tionalist challenge to liberalism is too brief to be satisfying. But
given his primary agenda in this book, this brevity is understand-
able.
In the end, Mehta comes back to the central question of why
champions of liberalism so enthusiastically endorsed colonialism.
According to him, the key to this question is the response of liberal
theorists as they cast their gaze on an unfamiliar world whereby
they saw those experiences and forms of life as provisional. The
empire as liberals conceived it was premised on the idea that in the
face of this provisionality it was right, even obligatory, to seek to
complete that which was incomplete, and guide it to a higher plane
of reason and purposefulness. For Mehta, "[t]hat judgment of
MEHTA, LIBERALISM AND EMPIRE, supra note 6, at 163.
For a compelling discussion of the link between Burke's background and his ideas,
see ISAAC KRAMNICK, THE RAGE OF EDMUND BURKE: PORTRAIT OF AN AMBIVALENT
CONSERVATIVE (1977).
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other peoples' experiences as provisional - and the interventions
in their lives that it permits - is the conceptual and normative
core of the liberal justification of empire."6 This posture Mehta
finds ultimately rooted in a fundamental orientation of modern
Western thought, "namely a desire to master and possess nature,
where nature was understood in the broadest sense as that which
was external to the mind."67 Mehta finds liberalism to be a deriva-
tive discourse of this broader orientation, in which,
being part of that orientation is to share in a project, which projects
itself by anticipation onto an unbounded future. As an implica-
tion of this, every "present," whether individual or collective, is
judged and acquires its meaning by reference to the projection of
which it is understood to be a part. The primacy of the projection
subsumes both judgment and understanding. Whatever is the
freedom of thought or the internal freedom that the projection
stems from gets carried over into its conception of what is in-
volved in understanding that which is, only nominally, still exter-
nal. In this sense of the term, understanding is tied to the project
from the outset. It therefore, in a strict sense, lacks the potential
to surprise. Similarly, the projection subsumes the "present" as a
specific, and not as a singular, halting moment, in which the
"present is not a transition, but one in which time stands still and
has come to a stop," where, as it were, the "'state of emergency' in
which we live is not the exception but the rule." In this project the
experiences of those who are, or remain, unfamiliar - of those
whose "present," whose life forms, are not deemed to be already
aligned along the anticipated axis of the projection - must neces-
sarily be viewed as provisional; provisionality being the term
through which an uncertain and unfamiliar encounter gets
mapped onto a plain of temporal and categorical familiarity. For
those in that condition there is no Fetzt-Zeit, no time of the pre-
sent, no singular experience in which the Day of Judgment is the
normal condition of history - only an infinite future. Within
this project man was made for the infinite. 68
In contrast to the liberal posture, Mehta articulates an attitude,
one he assigns to Burke, for "a conversation across boundaries of
r MEHTA, LIBERALISM AND EMPIRE, supra note 6, at 191.
6' Id. at 208.
Id. at 209-10 (internal citations omitted).
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strangeness," and terms it "a posture of imaginative humility."
9
This posture "accepts that there is no shortcut around the messi-
ness of communication, no immanent truth on which words can
fix, no easy glossaries of translation; instead, just the richness or
paucity of the vocabularies we use to describe ourselves and those
we are trying to understand." ° As critical legal scholars negotiate
traces of past oppressions in legal terrains of today in search of
peace, justice and dignity, this posture of imaginative humility may
come in very handy. In sites of post-colonial displacements and
multicultural hybridities, we must find modes of conversation and
deliberation in which the boundaries of what can be articulated are
never firmly established prior to the conversation. Only in such a
conversation, as Mehta contends, "power is denied space, and in
this sense the empire becomes an impossibility.""
Mehta's book would be very useful for a number of lines of in-
quiry in critical legal scholarship. It suggests fruitful lines of in-
quiry with regards to the relative exclusion or marginalization of
groups based on gender, race, class, sexuality or culture in formally
liberal democratic legal orders. It alerts us to possible contradic-
tions at the very heart of apparently coherent worldviews and pre-
scriptions for sustainable collective life. Most importantly, by high-
lighting the intersections of modernity and the colonial encounter,
Mehta underscores the need to situate and examine modern legal
history on a global plane. This should encourage us to uncover
traces of time, place and circumstances in the modern construc-
tion of the reasonable person as the only legitimate legal subject.
Imaginative humility would warrant against taking the history of
the world as an appendage to the history of modern Europe. In-
stead, we should endeavor to recover voices and choices erased by
the colonial encounter. Colonialism brought into sharp relief
many fundamental contradictions inherent in projects of moder-
nity and the way universal claims are often bound up in particular-
istic assertions. And as post-colonial studies teaches us, the colo-
nial encounter is not simply a thing of the past; it remains embed-
ded in the conceptual constructs, disciplinary regimes and preju-
dices it engendered. As legal scholars our contribution to antisub-
ordination struggles must include unveiling the colonial lineage of
Id. at 216.
" Id.
' Id. at 217.
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many hegemonic legal ideas and practices of today. Bringing this
lineage in sharper relief will give us a better purchase over strate-
gies of resistance, recovery and representation. As global projects
of neo-liberal restructuring, "humanitarian" intervention, har-
monization of legal regimes and delegation of sovereignty march
ahead amid assertions of the end of history and triumph of liberal-
ism, we would do well to remember the disjunction between the
theory and history of liberalism. Mehta's book should help us do
just that.

